MIB Browser

SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB

Standards (IETF)
The management information definitions for the
SNMP User-based Security Model.

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). This
version of this MIB module is part of RFC 3414;
see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
Organization
SNMPv3 Working Group
Root OID
1.3.6.1.6.3.15
Last updated
Objects
36
Source
Show full MIB
snmptranslate -m SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB -Tp
snmpwalk -v2c -c <community> -m SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB <host> 1.3.6.1.6.3.15

Imports

SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIBSnmpAdminString, SnmpEngineID, snmpAuthProtocols, snmpPrivProtocols
SNMPv2-CONFMODULE-COMPLIANCE, NOTIFICATION-GROUP, OBJECT-GROUP
SNMPv2-SMIBits, Counter32, Integer32, IpAddress, MODULE-IDENTITY, MibIdentifier, OBJECT-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, TimeTicks, Unsigned32, iso, snmpModules
SNMPv2-TCAutonomousType, DisplayString, PhysAddress, RowPointer, RowStatus, StorageType, TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TestAndIncr

OID tree

NameOIDTypeAccessStatusExample
NusmNoAuthProtocol1.3.6.1.6.3.10.1.1.1
NusmHMACMD5AuthProtocol1.3.6.1.6.3.10.1.1.2
NusmHMACSHAAuthProtocol1.3.6.1.6.3.10.1.1.3
NusmNoPrivProtocol1.3.6.1.6.3.10.1.2.1
NusmDESPrivProtocol1.3.6.1.6.3.10.1.2.2
IsnmpUsmMIB1.3.6.1.6.3.15
NusmMIBObjects1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1
NusmStats1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.1
SusmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.1.1Counter32RO0
SusmStatsNotInTimeWindows1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.1.2Counter32RO0
SusmStatsUnknownUserNames1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.1.3Counter32RO0
SusmStatsUnknownEngineIDs1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.1.4Counter32RO2
SusmStatsWrongDigests1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.1.5Counter32RO0
SusmStatsDecryptionErrors1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.1.6Counter32RO0
NusmUser1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2
SusmUserSpinLock1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.1TestAndIncrRW0
TusmUserTable1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2NA
RusmUserEntry1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1NA
CusmUserEngineID1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.1SnmpEngineIDNA
CusmUserName1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.2SnmpAdminString (SIZE (1..32))NA
CusmUserSecurityName1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.3SnmpAdminStringRO_snmptrapusernameX
CusmUserCloneFrom1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.4RowPointerRC0.0
CusmUserAuthProtocol1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.5AutonomousTypeRC1.3.6.1.6.3.10.1.1.1
CusmUserAuthKeyChange1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.6KeyChangeRC
CusmUserOwnAuthKeyChange1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.7KeyChangeRC
CusmUserPrivProtocol1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.8AutonomousTypeRC1.3.6.1.6.3.10.1.2.1
CusmUserPrivKeyChange1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.9KeyChangeRC
CusmUserOwnPrivKeyChange1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.10KeyChangeRC
CusmUserPublic1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.11OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..32))RC
CusmUserStorageType1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.12StorageTypeRC3
CusmUserStatus1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2.2.1.13RowStatusRC1
NusmMIBConformance1.3.6.1.6.3.15.2
NusmMIBCompliances1.3.6.1.6.3.15.2.1
MusmMIBCompliance1.3.6.1.6.3.15.2.1.1
NusmMIBGroups1.3.6.1.6.3.15.2.2
GusmMIBBasicGroup1.3.6.1.6.3.15.2.2.1

Textual conventions

KeyChange OCTET STRING
Every definition of an object with this syntax must identify
a protocol P, a secret key K, and a hash algorithm H
that produces output of L octets.

The object's value is a manager-generated, partially-random
value which, when modified, causes the value of the secret
key K, to be modified via a one-way function.

The value of an instance of this object is the concatenation
of two components: first a 'random' component and then a
'delta' component.

The lengths of the random and delta components
are given by the corresponding value of the protocol P;
if P requires K to be a fixed length, the length of both the
random and delta components is that fixed length; if P
allows the length of K to be variable up to a particular
maximum length, the length of the random component is that
maximum length and the length of the delta component is any
length less than or equal to that maximum length.
For example, usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed
length of 16 octets and L - of 16 octets.
usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of
20 octets and L - of 20 octets. Other protocols may define
other sizes, as deemed appropriate.

When a requester wants to change the old key K to a new
key keyNew on a remote entity, the 'random' component is
obtained from either a true random generator, or from a
pseudorandom generator, and the 'delta' component is
computed as follows:

 - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value
   of K;
 - if the length of the keyNew is greater than L octets,
   then:
    - the random component is appended to the value of the
      temporary variable, and the result is input to the
      the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and
      the temporary variable is set to this digest value;
    - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with
      the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5)
      of the keyNew to produce the first (next) L-octets
      (16 octets in case of MD5) of the 'delta' component.
    - the above two steps are repeated until the unused
      portion of the keyNew component is L octets or less,
 - the random component is appended to the value of the
   temporary variable, and the result is input to the
   hash algorithm H to produce a digest value;
 - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same
   length as the unused portion of the keyNew, is XOR-ed
   with the unused portion of the keyNew to produce the
   (final portion of the) 'delta' component.

 For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H:

    iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */
    temp = keyOld;
    for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
        temp = MD5 (temp || random);
        delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] =
               temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15];
    }
    temp = MD5 (temp || random);
    delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] =
           temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1];

The 'random' and 'delta' components are then concatenated as
described above, and the resulting octet string is sent to
the recipient as the new value of an instance of this object.

At the receiver side, when an instance of this object is set
to a new value, then a new value of K is computed as follows:

 - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value
   of K;
 - if the length of the delta component is greater than L
   octets, then:
    - the random component is appended to the value of the
      temporary variable, and the result is input to the
      hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the
      temporary variable is set to this digest value;
    - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with
      the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5)
      of the delta component to produce the first (next)
      L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the new value
      of K.
    - the above two steps are repeated until the unused
      portion of the delta component is L octets or less,
 - the random component is appended to the value of the
   temporary variable, and the result is input to the
   hash algorithm H to produce a digest value;
 - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same
   length as the unused portion of the delta component, is
   XOR-ed with the unused portion of the delta component to
   produce the (final portion of the) new value of K.

 For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H:

    iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */
    temp = keyOld;
    for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
        temp = MD5 (temp || random);
        keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] =
               temp XOR delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15];
    }
    temp = MD5 (temp || random);
    keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] =
           temp XOR delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1];

The value of an object with this syntax, whenever it is
retrieved by the management protocol, is always the zero
length string.

Note that the keyOld and keyNew are the localized keys.

Note that it is probably wise that when an SNMP entity sends
a SetRequest to change a key, that it keeps a copy of the old
key until it has confirmed that the key change actually
succeeded.

Used by